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The Supreme Court’s freedom-of-speech jurisprudence is complicated. There
are few hard and fast rules. One is that judicially imposed prior restraints on
speech are hardly ever permissible. In recent years, another hard and fast rule
appears to have developed. It is that the government may never prohibit speech
simply on account of its viewpoint. It remains unclear whether this is a per se
prohibition or whether such viewpoint-focused regulation must overcome the all
but insurmountable burden of serious strict scrutiny. In any event, any
governmental rule that attempts to regulate speech based on its point of view will
almost certainly be invalidated.
The anti-viewpoint-discrimination principle is of relatively recent origin. The
recent decisions in Matal v. Tam 1 and Iancu v. Brunetti 2 have especially invigorated
it, suggesting that a majority of the Court is prepared to apply it rigorously. This
article will describe the origin of the anti-viewpoint-discrimination principle,
define and consider its contours, develop the theory behind the principle, and
attempt to explain why it has recently emerged as a focal point of free speech
jurisprudence. 3
I.

* Professor of Law and Larry and Jane Harlan Senior Research Fellow, Dedman School of
Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
2. 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019).
3. See generally Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99
(1996), for an analysis of the caselaw, especially federal circuit court caselaw, as of 1996. See also
Maura Douglas, Comment, Finding Viewpoint Neutrality in Our Constitutional Constellation, 20 U. PA.
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As the Court has explained, viewpoint discrimination is a subset of content
discrimination. 4 As a matter of free speech law, content discrimination is very
troublesome, generally giving rise to strict scrutiny. 5 Viewpoint discrimination is
significantly worse, often leading to per se invalidation. The Court’s concern with
content discrimination predates the focus on viewpoint discrimination, although
several of the early content discrimination cases were actually instances of
unacknowledged viewpoint discrimination. Well before the Court began to focus
on either content or viewpoint discrimination, some of the laws it either upheld
or invalidated could have readily been analyzed as one or both. For instance, the
Court’s free speech jurisprudence was kickstarted by the famous seditious speech
cases of 1919. Abrams v. United States affirmed a conviction under the 1917
Espionage Act, as amended in 1918, which made it a crime to publish “disloyal,
scurrilous and abusive language” about the United States when it is at war. 6 The
conviction was upheld. Today, were the statute still in effect, in addition to the
Court’s significantly more protective seditious speech standard of Brandenburg v.
Ohio, the statute itself would be invalidated as patent viewpoint discrimination. 7
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE VIEWPOINT-DISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 8 arguably the most stirring and oftquoted free speech case, was a forerunner of the more recent viewpointdiscrimination principle. In the course of invalidating the school board’s
mandatory flag salute rule, Justice Jackson declared, “If there is any fixed star in
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion . . . .” 9 This is not quite a statement of the viewpoint-discrimination
principle, but it does highlight the fear of government manipulation of the
marketplace of ideas that informs it.
Cohen v. California, which predated the explicit viewpoint discrimination cases,
also provides significant support for the principle.10 There, the Court overturned
a conviction of a man who carried a jacket bearing the message “Fuck the Draft”
into a courthouse under a statute that prohibited “maliciously or willfully
disturb(ing) the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person . . . by . . . offensive
conduct.” 11 In striking down the statute, Justice Harlan noted that the First
Amendment puts “the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the
hands of each of us.” 12 He expressed concern that “governments might soon seize
J. CONST. L. 727, 744–54 (2018), for a more recent discussion of the caselaw.
4. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“Viewpoint
discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination.”).
5. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
118 (1991).
6. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919).
7. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 452 (1969) (per curiam).
8. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
9. Id. at 642.
10. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18–19 (1971).
11. Id. at 16.
12. Id. at 24.
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upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for banning the
expression of unpopular views.” 13 In Cohen, Justice Harlan wrote a brilliant
opinion highlighting several deficiencies with the law. Today, the focus on
“offensive conduct” would almost certainly condemn it as well under the
viewpoint-discrimination principle.
The Court’s concern with discrimination based on the content of speech began
to come into focus in the early 1970s. In the companion cases of Police Department
of Chicago v. Mosley 14 and Grayned v. City of Rockford,15 decided in 1972, the Court
invalidated ordinances that prohibited picketing near a school during the time
when school was in session with an exception for picketing with respect to a labor
dispute. 16 In Mosley, the Court struck down the statute on the grounds that the
content-based discrimination, exempting picketing for labor disputes, was
unjustified by the purpose of avoiding disruption of the educational process. 17
This launched the Court’s modern concern about content-based discrimination
under the First Amendment. Although the ordinance seemed to discriminate on
the basis of content (labor picketing) rather than viewpoint (opposition to
management practices), Justice Marshall employed language which would help
explain the Court’s subsequent strong concern with viewpoint-based
discrimination as well. He wrote:
[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power
to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or
its content. To permit the continued building of our politics and culture,
and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed
the right to express any thought, free from government censorship. The
essence of this forbidden censorship is content control. . . . There is an
“equality of status in the field of ideas,” and government must afford all
points of view an equal opportunity to be heard.18
With this, the Court’s concern with content, if not viewpoint-based
discrimination, was set in motion.
Building on Mosley, in 1980 in Carey v. Brown, the Court invalidated an Illinois
statute that banned picketing in front of a private residence but exempted labor
picketing. 19 For the majority, Justice Brennan noted that “it is the content of the
speech that determines whether it is within or without the statute’s blunt
prohibition.” 20 Then, in a footnote, he declared that it is “no answer to assert that
the Illinois statute does not discriminate on the basis of the speaker’s viewpoint,
but only on the basis of the subject matter of his message,” 21 seemingly recognizing
that this was a distinction that could matter in subsequent cases.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 26.
408 U.S. 92 (1972).
408 U.S. 104 (1972).
Mosley, 408 U.S. at 101–02; Grayned, 408 U.S. at 107.
Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95, 100.
Id. at 95–96 (internal citations omitted).
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 470–71 (1980).
Id. at 462.
Id. at 462 n.6.
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Two years later, in Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, the Court
set forth its tripart structure for analyzing the government’s ability to prohibit
speech on government property. 22 It divided such property into three categories:
traditional public forums, dedicated public forums, and nonpublic forums.23 In
traditional or dedicated public forums, regulation based on the content of the
speech would be subject to strict scrutiny. 24 In nonpublic forums, the Court
would demand only that the regulation be reasonable “and not an effort to
suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.” 25
The Court held that the teachers’ mailboxes at the heart of the controversy in
Perry were a nonpublic forum, upheld the regulation prohibiting an unrecognized
union from using the mailboxes to communicate with the teachers, and
concluded that there was “no indication that the school board intended to
discourage one viewpoint and advance another.” 26 The majority seemed to
distinguish regulation of content, which would be subject to strict scrutiny, from
the regulation of viewpoint, which would be prohibited per se.
Justice Brennan, filing a dissent joined by three other Justices, picked up on
this distinction, arguing that, “[o]nce the government permits discussion of
certain subject matter, it may not impose restrictions that discriminate among
viewpoint on those subjects whether a nonpublic forum is involved or not.” 27 He
declared, “Viewpoint discrimination is censorship in its purest form and
government regulation that discriminates among viewpoints threatens the
continued vitality of ‘free speech.’” 28 Justice Brennan would have found that the
regulation was in fact viewpoint-based discrimination in that it had the intent and
effect to close the mailboxes to a union with a different point of view on labor
relations.29 In a footnote, the majority responded that there was no evidence in
the record that the policy was adopted with the intent to freeze out contrary
viewpoints nor was it aimed specifically at the challenger union. 30 It would appear
that all members of the Court agreed that viewpoint discrimination was forbidden
but disagreed as to whether it was present on the facts of the case. Perry established
that the Court clearly considers regulation that discriminates based on point of
view to be an even more serious threat to freedom of speech than mere content
discrimination.
Three years later in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utility Commission, a fourJustice plurality, in an opinion by Justice Powell, invalidated a regulation in part
because it discriminated on the basis of viewpoint. 31 The commission had
promulgated an order requiring a public utility company to insert statements in

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–47 (1983).
Id. at 45–46.
Id.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 61 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 62.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 49 n.9 (majority opinion).
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1986) (plurality opinion).
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its billing envelopes that disagreed with the company’s positions. 32 The plurality
declared that the order “discriminate[d] on the basis of the viewpoints of the
selected speakers.” 33 Further, the order “impermissibly burden[ed] appellant’s
First Amendment rights because it force[d] appellant to associate with the views
of other speakers, and because it select[ed] the other speakers on the basis of their
viewpoints.” 34 Chief Justice Burger concurred, joining the opinion but limiting
his concurrence to the forced-association ground.35 Justice Marshall concurred in
the judgment. 36 For at least four Justices, it would appear that viewpoint-based
discrimination was a per se violation of the First Amendment. There was no
consideration in the Powell plurality of strict scrutiny or interest balancing.
In Texas v. Johnson, decided in 1989, the Court effectively relied on the antiviewpoint-discrimination principle to strike down a Texas statute that made it a
crime to desecrate a venerated object, including a state or national flag. 37 Johnson
had burned an American flag while participating in a political demonstration. 38
In the course of his opinion invalidating the statute, Justice Brennan declared
that, “[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that
the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society
finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” 39 This was a strong endorsement of
the anti-viewpoint-discrimination principle. The following year in United States v.
Eichman, the Court invalidated a federal statute passed in response to Johnson that
effectively only prohibited disrespectful destruction of the flag. 40 Quoting the
above sentence from Johnson, the Court concluded that Congress had not avoided
the constitutional defect that had doomed the Texas statute. 41
The following year, in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime
Victims Board, the Court invalidated the New York “Son of Sam” law, which
required entities that contracted to produce a book by a person convicted of a
crime to deposit in escrow any proceeds from the sale of the book to compensate
victims of the crime. 42 The Court categorized the statute as content discrimination
(though not viewpoint-based) and struck it down for failure to satisfy the narrow
tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny. 43 The case is especially significant on
account of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in which he argued that a statute
discriminating against speech on the basis of its content should be considered per
se unconstitutional and, thus, was inappropriate to apply strict scrutiny. 44 That
position has not prevailed with respect to content-based discrimination, but it may
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
(1991).
43.
44.

Id. at 6.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 21 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989).
Id. at 394.
Id. at 414.
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318–19 (1990).
Id. at 319.
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 108
Id. at 116, 118, 123.
Id. at 124 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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very well be the case with regulation that discriminates on the basis of viewpoint.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 45 decided in 1992, is one of the most significant
opinions explicating the anti-viewpoint-discrimination principle. There, the
Court unanimously struck down a St. Paul, Minnesota ordinance that made it a
criminal offense to place on private property a symbol (such as a burning cross as
appellant had done) that one knows or reasonably should know “arouses anger,
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender.” 46 Four Justices would have invalidated the ordinance for overbreadth. 47
However, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, struck it down on the ground
that it discriminated on the basis of viewpoint. 48 Justice Scalia conceded that the
Minnesota Supreme Court justified the statute as an attempt to regulate “fighting
words” that were beyond the scope of First Amendment protection. 49 Accepting
that, Justice Scalia nevertheless argued that the anti-viewpoint-discrimination
principle was so important to free speech jurisprudence that it applied even to
speech that was otherwise excluded from First Amendment protection. 50 That
would presumably not be the case with most other First Amendment doctrines,
highlighting the preeminence of the anti-viewpoint-discrimination principle in
free speech jurisprudence. Justice Scalia’s analysis would suggest that this principle
is at the very heart of serious free speech protection.
The second aspect of R.A.V. that is significant is that it was the first case in
which the Court attempted to define the viewpoint-discrimination principle. That
is, how exactly does viewpoint discrimination differ from mere content
discrimination? Justice Scalia defined viewpoint discrimination as “hostility—or
favoritism—towards the underlying message expressed,” 51 citing Carey.
He immediately recognized that, in order to square his opinion with existing
precedent, he needed to recognize several exceptions. First, Justice Scalia noted
that, where the basis of content discrimination is the very reason why particular
content may be punished, there would be a slight chance of viewpoint
discrimination. 52 Once again this signaled that viewpoint discrimination is a far
more serious offense to freedom of speech than content discrimination. An
example of this would be criminalizing only those threats against the President. 53
A second exception would be for regulation aimed at conduct that could have a
secondary or incidental effect on speech, such as adult business zoning laws or
sexually derogatory fighting words, which could constitute gender-based
discrimination. 54
Returning to the question of defining viewpoint discrimination, Justice Scalia
explained that the law clearly discriminated on the basis of viewpoint by only
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

505 U.S. 377 (1992).
Id. at 380.
Id. at 397 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 391 (majority opinion).
Id. at 392.
Id. at 384–85.
Id. at 386 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980)).
Id. at 388.
See id.
Id. at 389.
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criminalizing fighting words based on race, color, creed, religion, or gender.55
Justice Scalia assumed that in a situation of debate, viewpoint discrimination
would exist when one side is handicapped on the basis of what it can say. As he
noted, the state may not “license one side of a debate to fight free style, while
requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.” 56
The city argued that the statute could pass strict scrutiny as necessary to serve
the compelling state interest of helping members of traditionally discriminated
against groups to live in peace. 57 Conceding that this was a compelling interest,
Justice Scalia rejected the argument that a statute only prohibiting certain epithets
was narrowly tailored. 58 He recognized that St. Paul was attempting to make a
strong statement about race, religious, or gender-based discrimination; however,
“[t]hat is precisely what the First Amendment forbids.” 59 This final paragraph of
the Scalia opinion might suggest that, at least with respect to speech otherwise
excluded from First Amendment protection, regulation discriminating on the
basis of viewpoint is not forbidden per se but must instead be subjected to strict
scrutiny. That is cold comfort, however, since the opinion seems to conclude that
viewpoint-discriminatory regulation will never be narrowly tailored.
R.A.V. involved a municipal attempt to prohibit hate speech. The concurring
Justices would have invalidated the law based on overbreadth, leaving open the
possibility that more narrowly drawn hate speech regulation might be
constitutional. Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority seemed to go out of its way
to derail that possibility. Under R.A.V., regulation that bans hate speech with
respect to certain protected groups will violate the anti-viewpoint-discrimination
principle. Two of the primary defenses for hate speech laws were confronted and
rejected in R.A.V. Some hate speech regulation had been based on the theory that
fighting words were excluded from First Amendment protection. So, as long as
the regulation was limited to fighting words, there would be no problem. Justice
White, writing for three Justices, took that approach. 60 As noted above, writing
for the majority, Justice Scalia maintained that the anti-viewpoint-discrimination
principle applied to speech that was otherwise excluded from First Amendment
protection. 61
Another defense of hate speech regulation proceeded from the premise that
the harm caused by hate speech was qualitatively distinct and more serious than
the harm caused by other offensive speech, and, therefore, the state had a specific
interest in prohibiting it while not prohibiting other fighting words or personallyinsulting speech. Justice Stevens, writing for three Justices, took this approach.62
Justice Scalia confronted this argument and rejected it, characterizing it as “word
play.” 63 He explained that the reason why racial hate speech might cause
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 391.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 395–96.
Id. at 396.
Id. at 401–02 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 384–85 (majority opinion).
Id. at 433 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 392 (majority opinion).
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distinctive harm is due to the viewpoint, and, consequently, this theory essentially
boils down to an attempt to prohibit speech on account of discomfort with its
message. 64 By explicitly rejecting these two arguments, the Court made it difficult,
if not impossible, for a state actor to enact any significant prohibition of hate
speech that focused on specific types of speech or protected groups.
The following year in Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,
the Court invalidated a ruling by a local school board that banned the showing of
a film addressing issues of family and childbearing. The Court did so on the
grounds that the ruling violated a rule prohibiting the use of school premises for
religious purposes in view of a state law permitting the use of school premises for
social, civic, and recreational meetings. 65 The Court unanimously struck this
ruling down as prohibited viewpoint-based discrimination, which was
impermissible in a dedicated public forum. 66 The Court seemed to consider this
a per se violation of First Amendment freedom of speech, rejecting an
Establishment Clause defense. Lamb’s Chapel is further proof that, at least in a
public forum, viewpoint discrimination is flatly prohibited.
Two years later, again in the context of religious speech, in Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of the University of Virginia, the Court again relied on the anti-viewpointdiscrimination principle to invalidate a university regulation that prohibited
reimbursement of expenses to a student newspaper 67 that “primarily promotes or
manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.” 68 Wide
Awake offered “a Christian perspective on both personal and community issues,”
challenged students “to live, in word and deed, according to the faith they
proclaim,” and encouraged students “to consider what a personal relationship
with Jesus Christ means.” 69
Like R.A.V., Rosenberger is especially significant because the Court again made
an effort to distinguish viewpoint discrimination from content discrimination. In
reviewing the precedent, including Mosley, Perry, and R.A.V., the Court declared:
“Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination.
The government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific
motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale
for the restriction.” 70 In a limited public forum, such as that created by the
university, content restrictions consistent with the purposes of the forum are
permissible while distinctions based on viewpoint are “presumed
impermissible.” 71 The Court conceded that the distinction between content and
viewpoint could be “imprecise.” 72 Nevertheless, it concluded that prohibiting
religious perspectives as opposed to religious subject matter focused on viewpoint
64. Id. at 392–93.
65. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395–97 (1993).
66. Id. at 394.
67. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830–32 (1995).
68. Id. at 823.
69. Id. at 826 (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Id. at 829.
71. Id. at 830.
72. Id. at 831. See Kent Greenawalt, Viewpoints from Olympus, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 702–06
(1996), for criticism of the Court’s viewpoint-doctrine analysis in Rosenberger.
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as opposed to content. 73 The Court found viewpoint discrimination in Rosenberger
exclusively based on the text and application of the rule without any reference to
evidence of the university’s motivation. Although noting that the state had
abandoned the argument, the Court rejected the claim that the university’s policy
was necessary to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. 74 Most of Justice
Souter’s dissent focused on the Establishment Clause issue; however, he also
argued that the Court’s approach effectively erased the distinction between
content and viewpoint discrimination. 75 Justice Kennedy responded that the
dissent mistakenly addressed viewpoint discrimination by assuming a bipolar
debate. 76 However, Justice Kennedy argued that the exclusion of multiple
viewpoints still constituted viewpoint discrimination. 77 Since the university’s
focus was on perspective, it was going well beyond simply restricting speech based
on its subject matter. 78 This was a significant clarification of the nature and
breadth of the viewpoint-discrimination principle.
Good News Club v. Milford Central School, decided in 2001, is yet another
decision in which the Court relied on the anti-viewpoint-discrimination principle
to strike down a school regulation discriminating against religious speech. 79 Not
surprisingly, it relied heavily on Lamb’s Chapel and Rosenberger to support its
decision. 80 There, a school district that permitted the use of its facilities for
extracurricular activities of an educational, civic, and social nature prohibited the
use by a club that intended to engage in religious instruction and Bible study.
Given that the school district had created a limited public forum, the Court
invalidated the restriction as viewpoint discrimination. 81
In 2015, in Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., the Court upheld the
Texas Department of Public Safety’s rejection of an application for a specialty
license plate featuring the Confederate battle flag. 82 As Justice Alito argued in
dissent, had the Court considered the specialty license plate program (which had
approved over 300 different designs) to be a dedicated public forum, the refusal
would almost certainly have constituted prohibited viewpoint discrimination
given that the application was rejected on the ground that the flag was offensive. 83
The Court avoided this result by characterizing license plates, including specialty
license plates, as government speech. 84 The Court had previously recognized that,
as a speaker, the government is under no duty to be neutral among viewpoints. 85
The government-speech doctrine could impose a significant limitation on the anti-

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
Id. at 845.
Id. at 898–99 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 831 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 832.
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 120 (2001).
Id. at 107.
Id.
Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2253 (2015).
Id. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2249 (majority opinion).
See id. at 2247.
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viewpoint-discrimination principle if broadly construed.
In Reed v. Town of Gilbert,86 another 2015 case that clearly did not involve
viewpoint-based discrimination, the Court nevertheless emphasized the strength
of the principle. The Court applied strict scrutiny to invalidate a local ordinance
that subjected different types of temporary directional signs to distinct regulatory
burdens. 87 The Court concluded that the regulation was content based, though
viewpoint neutral. 88 In the course of striking it down, Justice Thomas noted that
“[i]nnocent motives do not eliminate the danger of censorship presented by a
facially content-based statute, as future government officials may one day wield
such statutes to suppress disfavored speech.” 89 In other words, the fear of
viewpoint discrimination is so strong that even relatively innocuous laws such as
the one in Gilbert, which imposed a heavier regulatory burden on “temporary
directional signs” than on “political or ideological signs,” are subject to extremely
searching review.
The Court’s 2017 decision in Matal v. Tam—invalidating on its face a federal
statute that prohibited registration of trademarks that disparage or bring into
contempt or disrepute any person living or dead (the Disparagement Clause) 90—
is the Court’s most important decision in the anti-viewpoint-discrimination line
of cases. The case was brought by an Asian-American band, the Slants, following
a refusal by the Patent and Trademark Office to grant a trademark for the band’s
name on the ground that it was disparaging to Asians. Justice Alito wrote an
opinion for a majority, in part, and for a four-Justice plurality. Justice Kennedy
wrote a concurrence for a four-Justice plurality. Significantly, all eight Justices
participating declared that the provision constituted unconstitutional viewpointbased discrimination. All eight agreed that the provision did not constitute
government speech immune from the viewpoint-discrimination principle under
Walker. Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence characterized the government
speech doctrine as the “one narrow situation in which viewpoint discrimination
is permissible.” 91 The Kennedy four only joined that portion of the Alito opinion
that rejected the argument that the Disparagement Clause constituted
government speech. 92
Much of Justice Alito’s discussion of viewpoint discrimination came during the
portions of his opinion rejecting the government’s “government program”
defense (III-C) and its commercial-speech defense (IV). 93 In responding to the
argument that viewpoint discrimination was permissible as part of a government
program, the Alito plurality declared that, although the clause prohibited
disparagement of any group, be it “Democrats and Republicans, capitalists and
socialists,” prohibiting disparagement was still a viewpoint-based prohibition. 94 As
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
Id. at 2231.
Id. at 2230.
Id. at 2229.
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764–65 (2017).
Id. at 1768 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 1765.
Id. at 1761, 1763 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1763.
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Justice Alito summed it up, “Giving offense is a viewpoint.” 95 This would seem to
be a major step beyond R.A.V. There, the Court seemed to suggest that a law that
banned hateful fighting words aimed at specified groups would constitute
viewpoint-based discrimination; however, the violation could be cured by simply
banning all hateful fighting words regardless of the target. In other words, a
categorical prohibition would constitute viewpoint discrimination while a
noncategorical ban would not. The Alito plurality appeared to reject any such
distinction if “giving offense” itself is a viewpoint. It would seem that the plurality
went out of its way to suggest that even noncategorical hate speech prohibitions,
as suggested by Justice Scalia in R.A.V., would also constitute prohibited viewpoint
discrimination. Perhaps a distinction might be drawn between speech that is
otherwise excluded from First Amendment protection where noncategorical
prohibition might be permissible (R.A.V.) and otherwise protected speech (Matal)
where it would not be. However, given the strength of the anti-viewpointdiscrimination principle as expounded by the Court, such a distinction makes
little sense.
Considering trademarks as commercial speech, the Alito plurality concluded
that the Disparagement Clause could not satisfy the intermediate standard of
review.96 Once again, perceived viewpoint discrimination proved fatal. The
plurality declared that the asserted government interest in preventing offensive
speech was in itself inconsistent with core viewpoint-neutrality principles of the
First Amendment. As for the asserted interest in promoting commerce by
discouraging speech that disparages minorities, the plurality rejected this on the
ground that “[i]t is not an anti-discrimination clause; it is a happy-talk clause.” 97
Justice Kennedy, also writing for a four-Justice plurality, concurring
condemned the Disparagement Clause as prohibited viewpoint discrimination. 98
He noted “[t]he law . . . reflects the Government’s disapproval of a subset of
messages it finds offensive. This is the essence of viewpoint discrimination.” 99 In
response to the government’s argument that the clause is content neutral because
it applies to any disparaging trademark, Justice Kennedy replied, “[T]o prohibit all
sides from criticizing their opponents makes a law more viewpoint based, not less
so.” 100 This built on the analysis in Rosenberger, which Kennedy cited at this
point. 101
Justice Kennedy then expanded on the very nature of the viewpointdiscrimination principle, noting that:
The First Amendment’s viewpoint neutrality principle protects more than
the right to identify with a particular side. It protects the right to create and
present arguments for particular positions in particular ways, as the speaker
chooses. By mandating positivity, the law here might silence dissent and
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id. at 1764.
Id. at 1765.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 1766.
Id.
Id. (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831–32 (1995)).
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distort the marketplace of ideas. 102
Justice Kennedy also explained that it did not matter that the government itself
was not proceeding from hostility to a certain message but was only concerned
with the reaction of those who were confronted with it. 103 As with R.A.V., Justice
Kennedy refused to accept this argument, noting that “[t]he government may not
insulate a law from charges of viewpoint discrimination by tying censorship to the
reaction of the speaker’s audience.” 104
Justice Kennedy declared that viewpoint discrimination warrants strict scrutiny
even when commercial speech is involved.105 Presumably, this is why Kennedy
declined to join section IV of the Alito plurality applying the intermediate
standard of review. However, he never attempted to apply strict scrutiny to the
facts. Rather, it appears that the presence of viewpoint discrimination doomed
the regulation no matter what.
The opinions in Matal emphasize the potency of the viewpoint-discrimination
principle as perhaps no other case has. Both the opinions of Justices Alito and
Kennedy confirmed that the viewpoint-discrimination principle applies with
respect to governmental creation of categories of unprotected or less-protected
speech and that it is no defense to claim that the regulation is viewpoint neutral
within the category. This should have been clear from Lamb’s Chapel and
Rosenberger; however, all eight Justices participating in Matal emphasized it. The
Court in Rosenberger divided 5–4 on this point. Matal affirmed it 8–0.
Next, both opinions tied viewpoint discrimination directly to government
censorship, an anathema to First Amendment values. Justice Kennedy tied the
viewpoint-discrimination principle to acknowledged free speech justifications
including the marketplace of ideas and speaker autonomy. 106 This emphasized
how very close this principle is to the core of First Amendment values.
Matal failed to resolve the question of whether viewpoint discrimination
constitutes a per se violation of the First Amendment or whether it simply leads
to the application of strict scrutiny. The Kennedy plurality stated that viewpoint
discrimination gave rise to heightened review but then made no attempt to apply
it, seemingly treating it as automatically unconstitutional. Perhaps it makes little
difference since it appears that the Court will not find the strict standard satisfied
once it has characterized a regulation as viewpoint discriminatory.
The Justices also emphasized the breadth of the viewpoint-discrimination
principle. To guard against any expansion of the Walker exception, Justice
Kennedy characterized government speech as “just one narrow situation in which
viewpoint discrimination is permissible . . . .” 107 And both the Alito and Kennedy
opinions indicated that the principle applied to commercial speech as well.
Indeed, Justice Kennedy declared that the presence of viewpoint discrimination
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id. at 1766–67.
Id. at 1766.
Id. at 1767.
Id. at 1767–68.
Id. at 1787.
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would raise the standard of review in the commercial speech area from
intermediate to strict. 108 As with R.A.V., where the majority applied the viewpointdiscrimination principle to otherwise unprotected speech, Matal suggests that this
is a meta-principle of free speech jurisprudence that defies ordinary doctrinal
categorization.
Two years after Matal, in Iancu v. Brunetti, the Court invalidated another
provision of the Trademark Act prohibiting the registration of “immoral” or
“scandalous” trademarks. 109 All nine Justices agreed that the ban on “immoral”
marks constituted unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Justice Kagan,
writing for six Justices, invalidated the ban on “scandalous” marks as well as
forbidden viewpoint-based discrimination. 110 Justices Sotomayor, Breyer, and
Roberts would have upheld the prohibition of scandalous marks as focused on
the mode of communication rather than the ideas communicated.111 As with
Matal, however, the Justices were unanimous on the principle that viewpointdiscriminatory regulation was unconstitutional. Justice Kagan noted that the
Patent and Trademark Office has treated “immoral” and “scandalous” as one
phrase and thus synonymous. 112 She also quoted dictionary definitions of the
words suggesting that both were concerned with the impropriety of the ideas
expressed. 113 Consequently, both terms, whether read together or separately, fell
afoul of the viewpoint-discrimination principle. Justice Kagan made no attempt
to apply strict scrutiny to the law. Rather, referring to Matal and rejecting the
government’s plea for overbreadth analysis, Justice Kagan wrote, “The Court’s
finding of viewpoint bias ended the matter.” 114 The majority’s approach in Iancu
indicated that governmental viewpoint discrimination is a per se violation of the
First Amendment. Justice Alito, the author of one of the plurality opinions in
Matal, added a short concurrence in which he declared, “Viewpoint
discrimination is poison to a free society.” 115 As with his opinion in Matal, Justice
Alito seemed to emphasize that the Court’s vigorous stance against viewpointbased regulation of speech was intended to have societal impact well beyond the
Trademark Act. He wrote: “[Viewpoint] discrimination has become increasingly
prevalent in this country. At a time when free speech is under attack, it is especially
important for this Court to remain firm on the principle that the First
Amendment does not tolerate viewpoint discrimination.” 116 Clearly, Justice Alito
was taking aim at attempts to stifle particular viewpoints on college campuses and
elsewhere and indicating that the Court stood ready to intervene to protect
freedom of speech against viewpoint discrimination by any public entities.
All three dissenters accepted the principle that government discrimination on
108. Id. at 1767.
109. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019).
110. Id. at 2302.
111. Id. at 2303–04 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 2304–08 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at
2308–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 2301–02 (majority opinion).
113. Id. at 2299–300.
114. Id. at 2302.
115. Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 2302–03.
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the basis of viewpoint violates the First Amendment. They argued, however, that
the term “scandalous” should be read separately from “immoral” and that it could
reasonably be understood as banning the manner of speech—profanity—as
opposed to the ideas presented by the speech.
II. CONTOURS OF THE VIEWPOINT-DISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE
As an explicit principle of First Amendment jurisprudence, viewpoint
discrimination is approximately forty-five years old, although its roots extend
further back. It was first recognized as a particularly egregious subset of the
broader but less severe content-discrimination principle. It would be fair to say
that over time the viewpoint-discrimination principle has grown to subsume more
of what might earlier have been characterized as mere content discrimination. The
obvious though difficult question is how to determine whether viewpoint
discrimination exists. This is best understood at the outset by concentrating on
explicit viewpoint discrimination on the face of regulation and then later
inquiring as to whether implicit viewpoint discrimination is also problematic.
The easiest and yet the most unusual case would arise when a statute prohibited
one side of a defined controversy, such as whether racial preferences in college
admissions should be permissible. A regulation that prohibited anyone from
propounding any position on this debate would be a clear example of viewpoint
discrimination and would implicate all the reasons why viewpoint discrimination
should be prohibited. Society has generally internalized this as a matter of social
norm, and, consequently, this type of blatant viewpoint discrimination rarely
occurs. The opponents of viewpoint-discrimination analysis in a particular case
will often argue that the absence of any attempt to ban a particular viewpoint in
the course of a specific debate indicates that there has been no viewpoint
discrimination. However, the Court has not construed the principle so narrowly.
Rather, most cases of viewpoint discrimination involve regulations that
prohibit a particular perspective, subject matter, or speaker. The Court has treated
these as if they effectively discriminated on the basis of a particular viewpoint.
Most viewpoint discrimination cases have involved governmental attempts to
prohibit a particular perspective. This was true of virtually all of the cases involving
bans on religious-oriented speech, including the leading cases of Lamb’s Chapel
and Rosenberger. If regulation prohibits or penalizes speech that takes a religious
perspective, it does not necessarily prohibit one side of a particular debate from
making its case. For instance, critics could allege that the regulation would ban
both religious-based arguments favoring, as well as opposing, abortion. However,
as Justice Kennedy recognized in his Matal concurrence, this is even worse in that
it eliminates even more potential arguments from the marketplace of ideas. The
Court has recognized that perspective-based prohibitions are often in fact aimed
at anticipated arguments that might flow from the particular perspective banned.
In other words, banning a perspective is often a thinly disguised method of
effectively banning a specific viewpoint. But even when the regulation is indeed a
good faith effort to prohibit a particular perspective rather than a concealed
attempt to suppress a specific viewpoint, it still implicates the reasons why pure
viewpoint discrimination is off limits in that it involves governmental restriction
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of the ideas which may be discussed.
Matal also involved an example of perspective-based discrimination, which the
Court unanimously rejected. The statute attempted to prohibit “disparaging”
trademarks (speech). Critics could argue that within the context of a specific
debate this would ban disparaging speech on different sides of the question.
However, the Court definitively rejected this approach. Characterizing this as a
“happy-talk” provision, Justice Alito recognized that it cut deeply into the ability
of the speaker to express his or her message or point of view. Justice Kennedy
agreed. As the Court recognized in Cohen and Johnson, governmental restriction
of the manner of speech will inevitably affect its content. Similar, but perhaps
slightly different, is the ban on particular language or form of argument as was
involved in R.A.V. Prohibiting fighting words based on race does not necessarily
disable a particular position in a specific debate as Justice Stevens argued. The ban
presumably would apply to both sides. However, it does restrict the individual
who has concluded that the use of race-based fighting words is the best way to
make a point. In that sense, as Justice Scalia recognized, the regulation does
handicap at least some speakers and as such creates the very problem that the
viewpoint-discrimination principle is intended to prohibit.
Yet another question arises when the regulation applies unequally to all
seemingly related speech. The cases in which labor picketing was exempted from
statutes prohibiting picketing near a school or residence exemplify this. On their
face, these would seem to be clear cases of content or subject-matter
discrimination rather than viewpoint discrimination. Even as such, they will be
subjected to demanding review and will usually be invalidated. Often, however,
such regulation might be perceived as concealed viewpoint-based discrimination,
thereby presenting the same problems. For instance, with respect to the exceptions
for labor picketing, it is likely that regulators probably believed that most of the
time labor picketing would exhibit a pro-labor rather than a pro-employer
viewpoint. If so, what appears to be a subject matter distinction may well be a
disguised viewpoint-based distinction as well.
There is also speaker-based regulation that may likewise be concealed viewpoint
discrimination or at least raise the same concerns. That was the case in Perry, in
which the Court first articulated the concept of viewpoint discrimination but then
concluded that a regulation that only permitted the recognized union to utilize
the school’s mail system was a permissible speaker-based distinction in a
nonpublic forum. Justice Brennan wrote a powerful dissent arguing that the
regulation should be invalidated as impermissible viewpoint discrimination
considering that the rival union desired to use the mail system to present a
different viewpoint on the subject of union representation. 117 Given the
development of the viewpoint-discrimination principle over the past thirty-five
years, Perry should have come out the other way and hopefully would if presented
to the Court anew today. There is of course the possibility that speaker-based
exclusions are simply thinly-disguised attempts at viewpoint discrimination. The
Court recognized as much in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund,
117. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 55, 57, 65 (1983) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
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Inc. 118 There, the Court held that participation in a federal government
fundraising campaign was a nonpublic forum and that the government could
reasonably exclude organizations like the NAACP, which were raising funds for
the purpose of sponsoring litigation. 119 Still, the Court noted that on remand the
lower court should explore whether the facial ban of organizations that intended
to “influence . . . public policy through political activity or advocacy, lobbying, or
litigation” was in fact concealed viewpoint-based discrimination. 120
So far, all cases of viewpoint discrimination have been based on distinctions
that have been drawn on the face of the statutes themselves. That is as it should
be. Attempts to delve into the motivation of legislatures in the absence of any
suspicious statutory distinctions would seem to be scarcely worth the institutional
cost. However, when a statutory distinction based on subject matter or speaker
identity raises the possibility that it has either the intent or will have the effect of
resulting in viewpoint-based discrimination or will present the same threats to free
speech values, then it is appropriate to treat it as viewpoint discriminatory without
consideration of actual legislative intent.
So, what standard does apply to viewpoint-discriminatory regulation? At the
outset, it should be noted that the Court has never sustained a regulation that it
has characterized as viewpoint discriminatory. This suggests that, as a practical
matter, there is a per se rule against viewpoint discrimination. In the public forum
context, the Court has stated that regulations based on content will be subjected
to strict scrutiny while noting that viewpoint discrimination is particularly
troubling. Regulation of speech in nonpublic forums is subject only to rationality
analysis, as long as the regulation is not viewpoint discriminatory. 121 The inference
is that viewpoint-discriminatory regulation in a nonpublic forum would raise the
standard of review to at least strict scrutiny if not resulting in per se invalidation.
In Pacific Gas, a four-Justice plurality invalidated a regulation that it deemed to
be viewpoint discriminatory after applying strict scrutiny. 122 In R.A.V., once the
Court concluded that the ordinance was viewpoint discriminatory, it found it to
be unconstitutional per se with no explicit reference to strict scrutiny. 123 In Lamb’s
Chapel, Rosenberger, and Good News Club, the Court struck down regulations, at
least as applied, in which schools engaged in religious discrimination against
religious speech. 124 In each, the Court seemed to conclude that the viewpoint
discrimination constituted a per se violation of freedom of speech. However, each
rejected the school’s attempted Establishment Clause defense. It was unclear
whether this was raised and considered as an independent defense or whether the
school was in effect arguing that strict scrutiny was applicable and the
Establishment Clause constituted a compelling state interest. In Matal, both the
118. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
119. Id. at 811.
120. Id. at 793, 812–13.
121. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992).
122. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1986) (plurality opinion).
123. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391, 395–96 (1992).
124. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 120 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830–32 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395–97 (1993).
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Alito and Kennedy pluralities, after condemning viewpoint discrimination as
inconsistent with the values and purpose of the First Amendment, invalidated the
Disparagement Clause as incapable of satisfying either intermediate or strict
scrutiny. 125 In Iancu, Justice Kagan assumed that proof of viewpoint
discrimination resulted in automatic invalidation of the law. 126 Following Matal
and Iancu, it seems clear that the Court has fashioned a per se rule against
viewpoint-discriminatory regulation with no opportunity for the government to
save the law by satisfying strict scrutiny. That may not always have been the case
as the principle developed, but it seems to be where the Court has ended up.
The language in the cases seems to indicate that viewpoint-discriminatory
regulation is in complete conflict with the First Amendment. As Justice Alito
noted in Iancu, “Viewpoint discrimination is poison to a free society.” 127 Even if
strict scrutiny applies, the regulation will inevitably be invalidated. Certainly, the
desire to foreclose a particular viewpoint from the marketplace of ideas could not
qualify as a compelling interest. Indeed, it is so inconsistent with First
Amendment values that it would not even qualify as a legitimate interest capable
of satisfying the lowest level of judicial scrutiny. Moreover, it is highly unlikely
that viewpoint-based discrimination could ever satisfy the narrow tailoring
requirement since, in almost every instance, the government could presumably
serve whatever compelling interest it put forth with non-viewpoint-discriminatory
regulation. At least, that’s how the law has developed so far. Thus, as a doctrinal
matter, viewpoint discrimination is either prohibited per se or subjected to
scrutiny that is strict in theory but fatal in fact, which comes out to the same place.
So, the next question—perhaps the most essential question—is why is this so?
Why has the viewpoint-discrimination principle become a virtual meta-principle
of free speech jurisprudence, similar to the effective prohibition of judicial prior
restraint? And, if this is so, is it justified by free speech theory?
III. JUSTIFICATION OF THE VIEWPOINT-DISCRIMINATION
PRINCIPLE
The viewpoint discrimination cases do explain why the principle is so deeply
embedded in free speech jurisprudence. In the early viewpoint discrimination
cases, the Court proclaimed that “the First Amendment forbids the government
to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of
others.” 128 However, the Court did not explain why this was so. Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence in Matal is perhaps the best attempt to explain why viewpoint
discrimination is particularly inconsistent with free speech values. One of the
most well-recognized justifications for vigorous protection of freedom of speech is
125. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764–65 (2017) (plurality opinion) (finding the
Disparagement Clause was not narrowly drawn to satisfy intermediate scrutiny, if viewed as
commercial speech); id. at 1767 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (holding that, as viewpoint discrimination,
the regulation must be subjected to “rigorous constitutional scrutiny”).
126. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2302 (2019).
127. Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
128. Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394 (quoting City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 804 (1984)).
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the “search for truth”/“marketplace of ideas” theory popularized by John Stuart
Mill and embedded in First Amendment jurisprudence by Justice Holmes in his
classic dissent in Abrams. 129 Justice Kennedy relied on this theory in his Matal
concurrence, declaring, “The danger of viewpoint discrimination is that the
government is attempting to remove certain ideas or perspectives from a broader
debate.” 130 Thus, any attempt to skew the marketplace of ideas, especially with
respect to a specific point of view or argument, is in conflict with this justification.
The same would hold with the self-government theory propounded by Alexander
Meiklejohn and adopted by the Court most explicitly in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan.131 At least with respect to speech that is at all relevant to public issues,
governmental-viewpoint discrimination would deprive citizens of access to
information essential to their obligations as citizens. The same would be true of
the third primary justification for protection of free speech—the liberty/autonomy
theory. There are several variations of this theory; however, the central theme is
that it is for the individual, not the government, to choose what to say and how
to say it, as well as what to hear. 132 Justice Kennedy recognized this in his Matal
concurrence, noting that the viewpoint-neutrality principle “protects the right to
create and present arguments for particular positions in particular ways, as the
speaker chooses.” 133 By restricting or prohibiting certain viewpoints, the
government undermines such autonomy.
There is yet another principle that looms large in explaining the Court’s
hostility to viewpoint discrimination: the anti-censorship principle. It can be
derived from and is supportive of the three primary justifications for freedom of
speech. It is that it is for the individual and not the government to determine
what is said, where and how it is said, and who may say it and hear it. To a large
extent, it is derived from historical experience that the government simply can’t
be trusted to censor speech given that it has strong incentives to restrict speech in
order to serve its own interests. 134 The Court has recognized this principle to be
central to its prohibition of viewpoint discrimination. As Justice Brennan
recognized in his dissent in Perry, “Viewpoint discrimination is censorship in its
purest form and government regulation that discriminates among viewpoints
threatens the continued vitality of ‘free speech.’” 135 Justice Kennedy picked up
this theme in Matal. In the course of rejecting a commercial speech exception for
viewpoint discrimination, he pointed out that “[t]o permit viewpoint
discrimination in this context is to permit Government censorship.” 136 He also
declared that government hostility to speech based on perceived audience reaction
129. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See generally Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., The
Lessons of 1919, 72 SMU L. REV. 361 (2019).
130. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1767 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
131. 376 U.S. 254, 269–80 (1964).
132. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI.
L. REV. 225, 233 (1992).
133. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
134. FLOYD ABRAMS, SPEAKING FREELY 245 (2005); KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS 4
(1995); FRED SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 81 (1982).
135. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 62 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
136. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1768 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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is at the heart of why viewpoint-based discrimination is prohibited. 137
Thus to distill the Court’s settled rejection of viewpoint discrimination, it
continues to believe that free speech is crucial to public debate in the marketplace
of ideas, essential to self-government, and that decisions as to the nature of speech
must be made by the individual rather than the state. Government censorship of
viewpoints threatens each of these interests and raises the very distinct possibility
of governmental manipulation of speech to serve its own interests. As such, the
principle has emerged that viewpoint discrimination is effectively per se
unconstitutional. As Justice Brennan recognized in his Perry dissent, to permit
viewpoint discrimination “threatens the continued vitality of ‘free speech.’” 138 In
other words, given the basic premises of First Amendment jurisprudence,
anything other than a rigorous prohibition of viewpoint discrimination would be
unthinkable.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE VIEWPOINT-DISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE
Considering that the viewpoint-discrimination principle has been clearly
embodied in free speech theory both as a matter of precedent and as free speech
has become popularly understood, it is not surprising that instances of explicit
viewpoint discrimination have become the exception. As the cases indicate
however, there are two areas in which the issue does arise. The first that has
hopefully been put to rest is a prohibition of religious speech in the educational
context as was the case in Lamb’s Chapel, Rosenberger, and Good News Club. To some
extent this may have been the result of governmental hostility to religious speech;
however, it is more likely the result of misplaced and excessive concern as to the
avoidance of potential Establishment Clause violations by schools. Presumably,
the Court has dispelled this fear.
The second and perhaps continuing area in which viewpoint discrimination
can arise is the regulation of hate speech. Most hate speech regulation, by its very
nature, will be viewpoint discriminatory. This will be attributable to the fact that
the government desires to protect certain specified groups against speech that is
deemed to be especially harmful or because the government wishes to make a
strong symbolic statement as to the extent to which it deplores such speech. The
movement to ban hate speech reached a zenith in the 1990s and was arguably
squelched by the Court’s decision in R.A.V., which explicitly rejected a particular
variation of hate-speech regulation as viewpoint discriminatory. However, in the
past decade, attempts to regulate hate speech, especially on college campuses, have
seen new life. This may be attributable to the fact that outside of the United
States, hate speech is banned in much of the rest of the world, 139 as well as to the
influence of the critical race studies movement. 140 To the extent that hate speech
137. Id. at 1764.
138. Perry, 460 U.S. at 62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139. See ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 177–86 (2d ed., 2005); SAMUEL WALKER, HATE
SPEECH 1–3 (1994).
140. See generally MARI MATSUDA, CHARLES B. LAWRENCE III, RICHARD DELGADO &
KIMBERLÈ WILLIAMS CRENSHAW, WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE
SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993).
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is banned by private institutions, in the absence of state action, no First
Amendment issue is raised. However, with respect to public institutions, the
viewpoint-discrimination principle will be presented. R.A.V. seemed to establish
the principle that what was characterized as “categorical” hate speech regulation
was forbidden as viewpoint discrimination. Categorical regulation specified
particular subjects such as race or religion that were off limits. Justice Scalia
concluded that focusing on particular subjects which could not be used as fighting
words inevitably discriminated on the basis of viewpoint. He seemed to
acknowledge, at least in the context of otherwise unprotected fighting words, that
a noncategorical ban would be permissible as a less-restrictive alternative.
Matal arguably rejected this interpretation, extending the viewpointdiscrimination principle to noncategorical hate speech as well. The statute
involved there did not simply prohibit trademarks that disparaged on the basis of
race or other specified categories. Rather, it was noncategorical in nature,
prohibiting the registration of all disparaging trademarks, period. After explicitly
recognizing that the statute “evenhandedly prohibits disparagement of all groups,”
Justice Alito declared, “Giving offense is a viewpoint.” 141 Justice Kennedy made
the same point, noting that “[t]o prohibit all sides from criticizing their opponents
makes a law more viewpoint based, not less so.” 142 Granted, these statements can
be reconciled with R.A.V. on the ground that R.A.V. involved otherwise
unprotected speech while Matal involved speech that fell within the First
Amendment’s domain, thus resulting in a more severe rule with respect to the
latter than the former. Even so, both opinions in Matal, representing all eight
Justices who participated, went out of their way to reject the categoricalnoncategorical distinction. As such, hate speech was not before the Court.
However, the Disparagement Clause, as applied to racially derogatory trademarks,
was closely related to hate speech regulation. Both pluralities seemed to stress that
even noncategorical regulation of hateful, insulting, or otherwise offensive speech
is likely to be invalidated under the viewpoint-discrimination principle. While this
is mere speculation, it was as if the Court was sending a message to public
institutions, especially universities, regarding potential hate speech regulation.
The message was, “Don’t go there—you have no hope.” In other words, the Court
may have been engaged in a preemptive strike. Justice Alito reinforced the message
in his concurrence in Iancu, noting that “free speech is under attack” and that the
Court must stand strong against viewpoint discrimination. 143 A Justice could
hardly have issued a clearer warning to public entities contemplating viewpointbased regulation, which hate speech laws all but certainly are. Consequently,
counsel for public institutions are likely to advise that under the law as it now
stands, attempts to regulate or prohibit hate speech are likely to be invalidated in
federal court. As long as the lower courts follow the law, the Supreme Court won’t
even need to get involved. Thus, Matal and Iancu should be read as an attempt by
the Court to end the argument over the constitutionality of hate speech regulation
once and for all.
141. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1749.
142. Id. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
143. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2302–03 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring).
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As an explicit doctrine, the viewpoint-discrimination principle is relatively
recent in origin. Its roots in free speech jurisprudence are quite deep, however.
Over time, the Court has broadened and strengthened it. The viewpointdiscrimination principle is quite consistent with free speech jurisprudential
principles and values. In an area in which there are very few clear rules, the
principle that it is impermissible for the state to discriminate against speech based
on its viewpoint, as broadly construed, seems to be quite properly embedded in
the law.

